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Este artículo examina las contribuciones de 
Hans Kelsen al establecimiento del primer Tri-
bunal Constitucional en Austria, analizando 
las diferencias centrales entre el modelo kelseniano de tribunal 
constitucional y el modelo de su maestro alemán, el jurista Georg 
Jellinek, al tiempo en el que se enfoca en el trasfondo histórico-
político especifico de Austria que ejerció un influjo en la confi-
guración e incluso en el colapso del Tribunal Constitucional. De 
manera distinta a la mayoría de trabajos dedicados a esta cues-
tión, este artículo le presta particular atención a la dimensión 
histórico-política tras los esfuerzos de Kelsen para crear un sis-
tema serio de defensa jurídica de la Constitución Austríaca. En 
este sentido, el modelo kelseniano de tribunal constitucional se 
analiza en referencia al problema de proteger a la joven democra-
cia austríaca, que surgió de las cenizas del Imperio Habsburgo, en 
contra de sus numerosos oponentes. Este problema se ubica en el 
centro de los trabajos de Kelsen sobre la democracia publicados 
en la década de 1920.   
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This article intends to examine Hans Kelsen’s 
contribution to the establishing of the first Aus-
trian Constitutional court, analyzing the key 
differences between Kelsen’s model of Constitutional court and 
that of his German mentor, the Jurist Georg Jellinek, while fo-
cusing on the concrete Austrian historical-political background 
which had an impact on the shaping and even on the collapse 
of the Constitutional Court. Unlike most of the works dedicated 
to such topic, this article pays a great attention to the historical-
political dimension behind Kelsen’s efforts to create a serious 
system of juridical defense of the Austrian constitution. In this 
sense, Kelsen’s Constitutional Court is analyzed in reference 
to the problem of protecting the young Austrian democracy - 
emerged from the ashes of the Habsburg Empire – against its 
numerous opponents. A problem which is at the core of Kelsen’s 
works on democracy published in the 20s.
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“Any minority – of class, religious or national – whose 
interests are in any way protected by the Constitution has an 
eminent interest in the constitutionality of the laws.”
H. Kelsen
1. The Constitutional Court in Austria: the antece-
dents 
The figure and personage of Hans Kelsen evokes even today, 
more than 40 years after his death, the Reine Rechtslehre, the sepa-
ration of law from history, philosophy, and politics –initiated, in 
terms of methodology, with Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre– the 
critique on the sociology of law, the State as a pure normative le-
gal order, and Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, i.e., constitutional jurisdic-
tion. 
It is precisely on this last aspect of Kelsen’s rich corpus of re-
search that I would like to focus, in particular, on the jurist’s contri-
bution to the creation of the Constitutional Court of Austria’s First 
Republic and, subsequently, to analyze the development of this ins-
titution until its considerable neutralization by conservative forces 
in 1929. It is not my intention to elaborate on the connections bet-
ween the Court and Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, a subject already 
extensively investigated, but to illustrate the historical and political 
dynamics, often quite complex and conflicting, that concretely in-
fluenced the creation and, subsequently, the crisis of the first Cons-
titutional Court of Austria which Kelsen himself had to address and 
mediate (Bongiovanni, 1998; Costa, Zolo, 2002; Vinx, 2007). 
My present objective is to (re)read Kelsen’s contribution to the 
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit within the very real and pressing historical 
and political context the jurist and professor of law found himself 
operating during the period from the close of the Great War un-
til 1929 (year in which the first Austrian democratic Constitution 
came to be amended in an excessively conservative mode). To fully 
understand this context necessitates consideration of a factor of ut-
most relevance: the Kelsian model of Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit was 
to become integrated, although with elements of undeniable origi-
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nality, into a legal-political tradition dating well back embodied by 
the Imperial Court (Reichsgerichtshof) of the Hapsburg era, and by 
prominent thinkers and political figures who had examined at great 
length the legitimacy and necessity of introducing effective moni-
toring of citizens’ rights through a judicial type organ. From among 
these, I would note, in particular, two personalities who, for various 
reasons and on different occasions, can be traced to Kelsen: his ex 
“mentor” in Heidelberg, Georg Jellinek, and his friend, leader of the 
Austrian Social Democratic Party, Karl Renner. 
The Imperial Court, previously mentioned, was officially intro-
duced in 1867 on the occasion of the Ausgleich which had transfor-
med the Austrian Empire into the Austro-Hungarian constitutional 
Dual Monarchy (Walter, 1971: 734-735).1 The new governmental 
body exercised three main duties: Spezialverwaltungsgerichtshof, to 
protect the “political rights” of citizens, although its decisions were 
not “cassatory”; Kausalgerichtshof, to resolve potential conflicts bet-
ween the Laender and the Center, which did not infringe on the 
competence of ordinary jurisdiction; and, finally, Kompetenzgerichts-
hof, to supervise the boundaries between administrative and judicial 
authorities, as well as between regional and state administrative au-
thorities (Brauneder, 1992: 738-739).
Karl Renner was well aware of the tradition and experience em-
bodied within the Reichsgerichtshof when, in his famous speech of 30 
October 1918 before the Austrian Provisional National Assembly 
(the governmental organ that had emerged after the collapse of the 
Empire), he declared: 
Currently we do not have the possibility of creating a State tribunal 
with all the guarantees of nonpartisanship and judicial objectivity. We 
have temporarily entrusted with this function a commission of this 
Assembly composed of 20 members. [...] Subsequently, in a not too 
distant future, we will revisit this point and instead of a State tribunal 
we will have a constitutional court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) which will 
occupy itself not only with the protection of citizens, but also with 
State provisions, the freedom to vote, and our public law (Stenogra-
phische Protokolle, 1918-1919: 33).
1 The idea of an imperial court was already clearly present in the March Constitution “granted” by Em-
peror Frances Joseph at the end of the revolutionary movements of ’48-’49.
Revista Co-herencia  Vol. 9,  No 16  Enero - Junio 2012, pp. 273-295. Medellín, Colombia (ISSN 1794-5887)
276
The social democratic Chancellor sought essentially to trans-
form the old Imperial Court into a true constitutional court (Ver-
fassungsgerichtsbarkeit). Renner had already addressed this subject in 
one of his most important texts, Das Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Na-
tionen (1917) (The Right of Self-determination of Nations) in which he 
envisaged the democratic and federal transformation of the old em-
pire, identifying in Bundesverfassungsgericht (the federal constitutio-
nal court) the necessary mechanism for protecting citizens’ rights, 
verifying the “constitutionality” of the laws and decrees emanating 
from member states, or Laender, and safeguarding the equilibrium 
between these and the Center.2
Renner remained faithful to the idea of a constitutional court 
even in 1918, although, according to his essay of the preceding year, 
he favored a more unitarian solution for the new Austria, with the 
declared aim of opposing the rival Christian Social Party, a staunch 
advocate for federalism (Ermacora, 1976: 48).3 
The term constitutional court was certainly not original to Ren-
ner. Rather, it derived from a work by the renowned jurist, Georg 
Jellinek, who in 1885 published a brief essay eloquently titled Ver-
fassungsgerichtshof für Österreich (A Constitutional Court for Austria) 
in which he called for a Verfassungsgerichtshof (constitutional court) 
to enforce the division of competences between the Center and the 
Laender (regions) in the western half of the Empire (Cisleithania) 
–which he judged to be utterly insufficient and unclear– and, prima-
rily, to defend the Constitution from potential excesses and trans-
gressions committed by the parties or parliamentary organ (Jelli-
nek, 1885: 8 ss).4 In this sense, the constitutional court exemplified 
Jellinek’s critical and mistrustful position towards the legislative 
organ, a position that accordingly characterized his work. Jellinek 
2 The federal constitutional court envisaged by Renner would have examined at the request of the federal 
government or parliament the constitutionality of a law emanating, for example, from a member state, 
without, however, the individual member states having the power to advance a similar request regar-
ding a law or act of central government or parliament (Renner, 1917: pp. 292-293).
3 I would like to underscore the fact that after the First World War the Christian Social Party were 
particularly prominent in the Länder, that is, where the push for a federal solution was strong, whilst 
the Social Democratic Party, whose “stronghold” resided in “Rote Wien”, the capital of the former 
emperor, were in favor, in principle, of a unitary and centralized state.
4 Similar consideration was expressed years before by the jurist and exponent of the Hungarian liberal 
movement, Count Joseph von Eötvös, who in 1854 proposed introducing a Superior Court to prevent 
the parliament from violating the Constitution. (Stourzh, 1989: 216-237).
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proposed a complete transformation of Reichsgerichtshof into Verfas-
sungsgerichtshof because only in this way would the Habsburg mo-
narchy become a solid “Constitutional State” (Jellinek, 1885: 6). 
It would seem that, through Jellinek, Renner had realized essen-
tially two important tenants: first, the idea that “where there was 
the need for resolution, this could happen only through a court ru-
ling”; second, the conviction that federal states, by their very confi-
guration, needed a constitutional court that could resolve potential 
disputes between the center and the periphery.
From words to action was but a brief step, for between Novem-
ber and December of 1918 the State Chancellery set out to “ferry” 
the Imperial Court into the new democratic Austria, transforming 
it into a true and proper constitutional court. Protagonist and wit-
ness of this significant event was Hans Kelsen who in December of 
1918 composed a thought-provoking memorandum on Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes ueber die Errichtung eines Verfassungsgerichtshofes (Design for 
the Activation of a Constitutional Court) in which, exactly as Renner 
had done, he called for the Court to provide for “electoral legitima-
tion” and the protection of the Constitution. Jellinek himself, as 
we have seen, had underscored the same issue, but, in my opinion, 
there is an appreciable difference between the student and the tea-
cher: in Jellinek’s case the defense of the constitutional court was, 
in function, clearly anti-parliamentary and from the perspective of 
a legal theory that recognized the ownership of sovereign power as 
belonging to the State alone (Fioravanti, 1976; 1999; 2001; 2002). 
In Kelsen’s case there was no anti-parliamentary bias. This di-
fference is due to several factors, from the changing historical and 
political context to the particular formulation of some of the major 
themes of public law that the young Kelsen had already expressed 
in his Habilitationsschrift of 1911 and Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechts-
lehre (Main Problems in the Theory of Public Law) where, in open 
debate with his mentor Jellinek, he defined parliament as an “organ 
of the people” rather than an “organ of the State”, criticizing two of 
the cornerstones of Jellinek’s juristische Lehre, that is, the idea that 
the State was the judicial agent and sole “producer of the law”, a 
function that, in his monograph of 1911, Kelsen attributed to the 
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parliament (Kelsen, 1911). 
We shall soon see how the memorandum of 1918 served only as 
a first step towards a far more extensive and concrete contribution 
Kelsen dedicated to the development of constitutional justice in 
the Austrian First Republic. 
2. The Creation of the Constitutional Court in Aus-
tria: history, politics, law
The mechanism of Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit formulated by Kel-
sen is far from being sic et simpliciter the product of abstract scientific 
speculation. In many ways, this mechanism was the response to spe-
cific stimuli and specific historical and political issues among which 
one of the most compelling regarded the institutional form the new 
Austria would assume: Would it be better to transform the country into 
a unitary and centralized State or a federal republic? Would it be better to 
opt for a federation or a confederation? A question anything but rhe-
torical or “academic” in an Austria fresh out of the first world con-
flict: the fall of the Empire had immediately led to an open “con-
frontation/clash” between the new central institutions, namely, the 
National Assembly, and the Laender. Subject of the “dispute” was 
the future institutional design of the country. The first law (here, I 
would translate as “act”) issued by the Constitutional Provisional 
National Assembly (established in 1918), sanctioned the transition 
from a monarchy to a democratic republic founded on the primacy 
of legislative power, a principle ardently supported by the Social 
Democrats who, within the two-year period of 1918-1919 represen-
ted one of the major political forces in Austria (Stenographische 
Protokolle, 1918-1919: 32-33).5 
If the Socialists were favorable to a unitary design, the Christian 
Socialists, the main conservative party, pressed for a federation, in-
terpreting, thus, the reasoning of the Laender. It was immediately 
clear to all that the unitary and centralized option was not feasible, 
5 From the social democratic perspective, the primacy of the legislative organ, not only represented a way 
to underscore the radical political changes occurring in Austria after the end of the Monarchy but also 
the true and proper guarantee of popular sovereignty, for which the Socialists had relentlessly fought.
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for which the political problem that arose for the Provisional Na-
tional Assembly and the political parties that took part in it was 
to determine how much liberty to grant to the Laender and which 
competences (Stenographische Protokolle, 1918-1919). 
The SPÖ (Austrian Social Democracy) understood the first 
constitutional law as an integral part of a broader political design 
that envisaged a clear and precise subordination of regions to the 
Center. From this perspective, one could interpret the law of 14 
November 1918 as the “assumption of State authority in the Laen-
der” which recognized the autonomous administration of the re-
gions and municipalities but reaffirmed the existence of a State in 
which the regions, in fact, held a subordinate position in respect 
to the Center. This latter aspect was explained in the principle of 
“Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht” (the law created by the Center pre-
vails over that of the regions), according to which the laws appro-
ved by regional assemblies could only be enacted if ratified by the 
State Council (Stenographische Protokolle, 1918-1919: 65 ss.).   
The Constitutional Court was officially introduced on 25 
January 1919: it would arbitrate conflicts of competence, potential 
disputes between central institutions and the Laender–as Kelsen 
himself advocated in his memorandum–and the violation of politi-
cal rights (Schmitz, 2003: 245-246). Within a few months decisive 
steps had been taken for the future of the country, but relations 
between the Center and Laender had to be better defined. This con-
sisted, essentially, of determining what type of federal State to create, 
in other words, of writing a constitution.
It was Karl Renner, in his position as Chancellor, who entrusted 
Kelsen in the spring of 1919 with the task of drafting several cons-
titutional blueprints.6 The first, the so-called K-I, was certainly the 
most laenderfreundlich (favorable to the Laender). It was inspired by 
the Swiss Constitution of 1874, providing for a federal solution as 
well as the equalization of the Federal and Laender Chambers and 
the considerable independence of the regional legislation from that 
6 More precisely, it was at the end of October 1918 that Kelsen was invited by Renner to participate, as 
a jurist and legal technician, in the drafting of the Constitution. (Losano, 2008: 108).
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of the Bund (Schmitz, 1981: 114; Schmitz, 1991: 49-59). 
Renner clearly disapproved of the laenderfreundlich aspect of the 
K-I, so Kelsen elaborated two additional plans that reflected a major 
influence on the part of the Social Democratic Party leader. In the 
K-II the Austro-German State was defined as “a democratic repu-
blic, founded on popular sovereignty” and the relationship between 
the Center and the Laender came to be modified in favor of the for-
mer (Schmitz, 1981: 114). Kelsen realized that the endgame would 
have obtained a federal solution but considered equally important 
specifying what he intended by federal State and, particularly, the 
connection between constitutional jurisdiction and a federal sys-
tem. A contribution of chief importance in this vein was Die Ste-
llung der Laender in der kuenftingen Deutschoesterreich (The Position of 
the Laender in Contemporary German Austria), a brief essay published 
the day after the law of 14 March 1919 on the “assumption of sove-
reignty in the Laender” (Kelsen, 1919: 8). 
Kelsen clearly envisaged that the new Austria would be trans-
formed into a federal State, but this did not necessarily entail the 
idea of Austria being a “(con)federation of the Laender” –as was, 
on the contrary, sustained by the Laender– because, according to 
Kelsen and, likewise, to the Social Democrats and Renner himself, 
sovereignty was not granted by the Laender to the National Assembly, 
but by the National Assembly to the Laender:
The concept of a free and contractualistic union of the Laender with 
German Austria as a federation of states (confederation) and the con-
cept of an Austro-German State existing in a unitary constitution are 
irreconcilable. (Kelsen, 1919: 9).
The Austrian State had been achieved following the assumption 
of full sovereignty on the part of the National Assembly and not on 
the basis of a contract with the Laender. Shifting from theoretical 
sphere to practical application, Kelsen observed that the new Cons-
tituent Assembly would opt for the federalist solution, but precisely 
in this eventuality it would become vital to neutralize the centrifu-
gal tendencies of the Laender and to maintain equilibrium between 
them and the Center, setting in motion a “Bundesverfassungsgeri-
chtshof”. The latter could appeal to the Bund, the federal govern-
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ment, against unconstitutional laws of the Laender, in defense of 
the Constitution (Kelsen, 1919: 11). Kelsen’s position reflected in 
part the law of 14 March 1919, which introduced preventative con-
trol by the federal government over laws produced by the Laender 
when there was suspicion of unconstitutionality (Ermacora, 1989: 
32-33).
Months later, Kelsen challenged the contractualistic claims of 
the Laender in his article published in 1920 for “Neue Freie Presse”, 
Der Vorentwurf der oesterreichischen Verfassung (Preliminary Design of 
the Austrian Constitution). The Austrian Federal State was not born 
after the Laender had ceded their native sovereignty to the new 
central institutions, rather, on the basis of the concrete necessity 
to preserve the unity of the State from the destructive potential of 
the Laender:
If the Swiss ascribe so great an importance to their individuality, they 
did so for good reason, because before the cantons there was no State 
and since that very State was born following a progressive sharing of 
common existence. For us the State is everything, it is a unity (Kelsen, 
1920: 317).
 
After the collapse of the old empire, a State was created, based, 
for a series of reasons, on a specific federal organization. In Austria 
the whole preceded the parts and, on this very basis, the jurist rebu-
ffed the equitative partition of the Federal and Laender chambers, 
for which, in the case of conflicts between regions and central ins-
titutions, he proposed a constitutional court to which the federal 
government could appeal exclusively (Kelsen, 1920: 321). 
In his 1920 article Kelsen expressed a position that, on a po-
litical level, was closely analogous to the social democratic posi-
tion and, at the same time, reasserted his faith in constitutional 
jurisdiction as a necessary tool for balancing the relations between 
the Center and the regions within the Federal State, averring an 
idea long ago expressed by his former mentor of Heidelberg, Jellinek 
(Pergola, 1981: VII). In the aforementioned articles, Kelsen thus 
entered into a rather broad political debate directly regarding the 
relationship between the Center and the Laender in the future Fe-
deral State around which a series of important political and public 
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initiatives was conducted, for example, the interdepartmental talks 
held in the Chancellery (of which Kelsen himself took part). The 
issue reemerged, central to both Renner and Kelsen, of absorbing 
and neutralizing the centrifugal forces of the Laender in the future 
Federal State. With this perspective, during the interdepartmental 
session of 11 October 1919, Renner reiterated several times the im-
portance of preventing the laws created by the Laender from having 
predominance over those of the Bund (Ermacora, 1981: 73). 
This position was in open contrast to that expressed by nume-
rous Laender, particularly the Land Tyrol, a position which, in a 
constitutional draft written by the jurist Stephan Falser and sent 
to Renner in September of 1919, called for, analogous to the Swiss 
Constitution of 1874, the equal relegation of federal legislation to 
a federal assembly and a regional chamber and the creation of a 
constitutional court to which the Landtag (State Diet), i.e., regional 
parliaments, could appeal against a federal law deemed unconstitu-
tional (Schmitz, 1981: 62). 
From this perspective, in the summer of 1920, the writing of the 
Constitution passed definitively into the hands of three great par-
ties (Social Democratic, Christian Socialist, and Nationalist), who-
se constitutional drafts were sent to the Subcommittee on Consti-
tutional Affairs (Schmitz, 1991: 96-97).
All three spoke of a federal republic, two chambers, one federal 
and the other regional, and a constitutional court to which, on the 
specific request of the Tyrol, the Laender could appeal. In the draft 
of the Social Democrats, a preference accorded to the Bund, howe-
ver, was evident (Ermacora, 1967: 158-159).7
It was the Subcommittee on Constitutional Affairs that was 
commissioned with writing the text of the Constitution which, ge-
nerally speaking, resulted in a sort of compromise among the three 
great Austrian parties. During the subcommittee session, Kelsen 
himself played a key role: maintaining a position similar to that 
7 As testimony to this, in the social democratic draft, presented by Robert Dannenberg, distinguished 
member of the party, the Federal Chamber (Bundestag) was defined as “the highest legislative organ”, 
while in the Länder Chamber (Bunderat) was entitled to a “right of veto” that the Federal Chamber 
could easily override by voting a second time for a law proposed and potentially thwarted by the other 
Chamber. Ibid.
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of the Social Democrats, Kelsen defended the primacy of legisla-
tive power and the legality of the administration; moreover, the 
division of the Constitution into chapters was duly influenced by 
him. In regard to the Constitutional Court, with the contribution 
of his student, Adolf Merkl, Kelsen introduced the so-called ex offi-
cio procedure which envisaged the possibility of the self-activation 
of the Constitutional Tribunal regarding laws or regulations that 
constituted the premises of its rulings. In other words, the principle 
of the Constitutional Court was to be realized as “objective defen-
der of the Constitution”, a principle to which Kelsen would remain 
ardently faithful in the years to come (Bongiovanni, 1998: 190).
3. Kelsen and constitutional justice (1920-1929)
The promulgation of the Austrian Constitution in October of 
1920 did not exhaust Kelsen’s dedication to, and interest in, the 
Court and its functions. Moreover, in 1920, he was appointed judge 
of the Constitutional Court, in place of his mentor, Edmund Bern-
tzik, who had died shortly before.8
It was specifically in 1920 that the Austrian jurist published one 
of his fundamental works, Das Problem der Souveranitaet (The Pro-
blem of Sovereignty), in which he defined the State as a legal order 
and sovereignty, a “quality” of this order. Three years later he retur-
ned to occupy himself with the Constitutional Court in Verfassungs 
und Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit im Dienste des Bundesstaates, nach der 
neuen oseterreichischen Bundesverfassung vom I Oktober 1920 (Consti-
tutional and Administrative Justice in the Service of the Federal State). 
For Kelsen, constitutional and administrative jurisdiction re-
presented two of the more important institutions introduced into 
the new Austria, their being essential to preserving the equilibrium 
between the federation and the regions, between the Center and 
the Laender, and, therefore, to maintaining the intrinsic unity of 
the State. Kelsen departed from historical data to develop a broader 
and more substantial reflection on the meaning and value of consti-
tutional and administrative jurisdiction.
8 Kelsen reamaine judge of the Constitutional Court until 1929. (Losano, 2008: 110-111).
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Kelsen noted that the Federal Constitution was rapidly enacted 
by the Constituent National Assembly9 in order to prevent the Laen-
der from taking advantage of a drawn-out decision-making process 
to “realize the Constitution by agreement” and thus transform Aus-
tria into a confederation. Analogous to what has previously been 
stated, in Der Vorentwurf der oesterreichischen Verfassung (1920), 
Kelsen interpreted the Federal Constitution as “the law of a unitary 
State transformed into a federal State” (Kelsen, 1920: 11).
To Kelsen, characteristic of both jurisdictions was a substantial 
“reciprocity”: 
By this route the control the constitutional court and the adminis-
trative court exercise in regard to the Laender loses its semblance of 
unilaterality; so much so that the Constitution observes in this regard 
a certain reciprocity recognizing for the control over the Laender, the 
initiative of the Federation, and for the control over the Federation, 
the initiative of the Laender. (Kelsen, 1920: 11).
The reciprocity of which Kelsen was speaking and which –as we 
have previously sought to demonstrate– was painstaking established 
after a long and acrimonious confrontation between the represen-
tatives of the central institutions and the Laender, was the essential 
indicator of a balance having been achieved between “federal law” 
and “regional law”:
The solution that the Austrian Constitution offered to the conflict 
between federal and Laender law appears thus to also be in accordance 
with the principles of the Federal State. Not federation law such that 
prevails over the law of the Land but constitutional law prevails over 
that which is unconstitutional, that it would consist of the law of the 
Federation and of the Land. (Kelsen, 1920: 22).
 
For Kelsen, such a “balance” was, so to speak, the natural coro-
llary of what could be termed the primacy of the Constitution, or, 
better, constitutional law:
9  The Constituent National Assembly was succeeded by the Provisional National Assembly.
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In calling for the examination and nullification for the unconstitutio-
nality of a law, the federal government and the governments of the 
Laender are not required to demonstrate that the contested law had 
transgressed against a particular interest of theirs. That which the Fe-
deration and the Laender—by means of a reciprocal control—assert is 
the interest in the constitutionality of the law. (Kelsen, 1920: 23).
If constitutional and administrative jurisdiction was to ensure 
the “constitutionality of the law”, what was the significance of the 
Constitution? Kelsen responded to this question in one of his most 
elegant and famous essays, Constitutional Justice. (Kelsen, 1928: 
150). I would like to reflect particularly on the political significance 
of his response which, in my opinion, aids in a better understanding 
of the stance the jurist maintained, specifically at the close of the 
1920s, towards the slow and unrelenting decline of democratic ins-
titutions in Austria:
Notwithstanding the multiple transformations undertaken, the notion 
of constitution has retained a permanent core: the idea of a supreme 
principle that determines the whole State order. Whatever the means 
by which it comes to be defined, the constitution is ever the founda-
tion of the State, […] the essence of the established community by 
this order. [….] What is intended in the first place and in each case by 
constitution […] is a principle in which the balance of political forces 
is legally exerted in a given moment. (Kelsen, 1928: 152). 
The constitution was thus the supreme foundation of the Sta-
te, product, in a tangible historic process, of a compromise between 
diverse forces and political groups with their diverse ideas, interests 
and perspectives.10 Precisely:
It is the indispensible basis of the legal norms that regulate the reci-
procal conduct of the members of the State collectivity and, there-
fore, as well, those legal norms that determine the organs necessary 
for applying and imposing them, and the mode in which such organs 
must proceed, definitively, the fundamental structure of the State or-
der. (Kelsen, 1928: 153).
10 It should be highlighted that the idea of equilibrium between the various political forces represents one 
of the principle themes of Kelsen’s first works dedicated to democratic theory; specifically, I am referring 
to the first and second editions of Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (1920; 1929).
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Nevertheless, Kelsen recognized that the constitution not only 
envisioned norms that “regulate the formation of the laws” but also 
“their content”; parliament, in fact, was obligated to respect and 
give due and careful consideration to these very principles in its 
legislative work.
The Constitution is, then, not only a procedural rule but also a subs-
tantive rule; therefore, a law may be unconstitutional either because 
of a procedural irregularity related to its creation or because of content 
contrary to the principles or directives formulated by the constituent, 
when it exceeds the preset limits (Kelsen, 1928: 154). 
Whether in the “formal” or “material” sense of the term, the 
Constitution was the supreme “foundation of the State”, and, spe-
cifically because of this, it was absolutely necessary to “ensure” to it 
“the greatest stability”, (Kelsen, 1928: 153) which, in the opinion 
of the jurist, could not be guaranteed by a parliament that believed 
itself “the liberal creator of law and not the organ which applies it” 
(Kelsen, 1928: 171):
It is therefore not possible to rely on the parliament itself to realize 
subordination to the constitution. The task of nullifying its unconsti-
tutional acts must be entrusted to a separate organ, independent of it 
and of any State authority, i.e., a constitutional jurisdiction or tribunal 
(Kelsen, 1928: 171-172).
To those who saw in the constitutional court a serious and dan-
gerous restriction on the sovereignty of the legislative organ, Kel-
sen responded that legislation itself was “subordinate to the cons-
titution” (Kelsen, 1928: 172). During the process of creating the 
Constitution (1918-1920), Kelsen supported Austria’s legal-centric 
paradigm, so ardently advocated by the SPÖ and by Renner, but, in 
regard to the protection of the Constitution, he saw in the excessive 
power of Parliament, as well as of the Executive, a potential threat 
to the protection of the Constitution (Pergola, 1981: X).11 
11 One recalls in this regard the quarrel between Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on The Guardian of the Consti-
tution, in which Kelsen, in debate with Schmitt, argued against the idea of entrusting the protection of 
the Constitution to the president of the Republic, or to a person who was not a judge.
Hans Kelsen and the Austrian Constitutional Court (1918-1929)
Sara Lagi
287
On the other hand, Kelsen attributed to constitutional jurisdic-
tion the rather political merit of preserving the principle of “division 
of power”, since, by such means, it was possible to avoid the “con-
centration of excessive power in the hands of a single organ”, for 
example, the parliament or the president of the Republic which, as 
the jurist was quick to explain, would be “detrimental to democra-
cy” (Kelsen, 1928: 174).
The rest of the essay was dedicated to the juridical-technical 
aspects of constitutional justice and constitutionality control. Kel-
sen examined the subject, its criteria, the procedure for the control 
of constitutionality, to conclude with a dense final chapter on the 
“legal and political meaning of constitutional justice” which, to me, 
renders a particularly interesting historical-political perspective, 
when related –as I will do shortly– to the particular Austrian politi-
cal reality of that period (Kelsen, 1928: 160-198). 
On a juridical level, Kelsen observed that “a constitution that 
is missing the guarantee of nullification of unconstitutional acts is 
not, in a theoretical sense, completely binding” (Kelsen, 1928: 199). 
In my opinion, however, the matter becomes still more interesting 
when Kelsen turned his attention to the political implication of cons-
titutional justice. In short, constitutional justice should ensure that 
the laws enacted by the parliament were “constitutional” and that, 
specifically in performing this important function, it allowed for a 
concrete protection of the minority against movements of libertici-
de on the part of the majority present (Kelsen, 1928: 201-202):
The domain of the latter is tolerable only if it is regulated. The specific 
constitutional form, which ordinarily consists in the fact that the re-
vision of the constitution requires a reinforced majority, signifies that 
some fundamental issues can be resolved only with the agreement of 
the minority; the simple majority, at least on some matters, does not 
have the right to impose its will on the minority, in the sphere of gua-
ranteed constitutional rights. Any minority – of class, religious or na-
tional – whose interests are in any way protected by the constitution 
has an eminent interest in the constitutionality of the laws. (Kelsen, 
1928: 202).
Constitutional justice, in its most political sense, seemed to Kel-
sen a tool of effective guardianship of the minorities and, in final 
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analysis, of the very democracy which had to be founded on a dia-
lectical and peaceful relationship between majority and minority 
(Kelsen, 1928: 203). In this way, Kelsen did nothing but confirm 
what had already been asserted, eight years prior in On the Essence 
and Value of Democracy, namely, that a political order was genui-
nely democratic on the condition of true protection of the minority: 
constitutional justice had to be considered from this perspective. 
In political terms, the Constitutional Court acquired its full and 
complete meaning specifically within the federal states, since it was 
established to guarantee the lasting equilibrium between the Center 
and the regions:
It is no exaggeration to affirm that the political idea of the Federal 
State is fully realized only with the institution of a constitutional tri-
bunal. [….] The essence of the Federal State […] resides in the alloca-
tion of functions whether legislative or executive between the central 
competent organs for the State—or its territory—in its entirety and a 
plurality of local organs, whose competence is limited by the State, to 
a part of its territory (Kelsen, 1928: 204-205). 
In this passage Kelsen was clearly referring to what he had stated 
in his 1918-1919 papers with the scope of, once again, highlighting 
the inescapable bond between federation and constitutional court, 
whose role, therefore, was that of “an objective and, so to speak, 
arbitral organ” capable of mediating and resolving the “conflicts of 
interest characteristic of the Federal State” (Metall, 1969: 45-48). 
The efficient solution to such a potentially disruptive “conflict” 
came to be secured, among other things, by the authority accor-
ded not only to the Central State but also to the member states 
to appeal to the Constitutional Court. Kelsen thus reaffirmed the 
reciprocity of constitutional justice, which he had already addressed 
in Verfassungs und Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit (1920), and that had 
been historically and politically affirmed in the new Austrian Republic 
at the close of the constitution-writing process, after extensive and 
drawn-out negotiations between the central institutions, in particu-
lar, the Social Democrats, and the Laender, often supported by the 
Christian Socialists.  
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In the two essays previously cited, the Constitutional Court 
came thus to represent the guarantor of State unity and indispen-
sible mechanism for better safeguarding the Austrian democratic 
system.
The essay on Constitutional Justice was published, poignantly, in 
1928, when, by this point in time, the political equilibrium of the 
country was veering ever more in favor of conservative forces, the 
Christian Socialists and the Nationalists (Metall, 1969: 45-48). 
Already in 1927, the Christian Socialists, bolstered by ecclesias-
tical support, launched a vast anti-socialist offensive, with the scope 
of modifying the 1920 Constitution towards an ever more conser-
vative model, shifting the “barycenter” of power from Parliament to 
Government. One of the principle obstacles to overcome in order 
to realize such an ambitious design was certainly the Constitutional 
Court which had to be reorganized and subdued to the interests of 
the Christian Socialists (Metall, 1969: 47-50). 
Specifically, the close of the 1920s witnessed the creation of an 
open clash between the Court and the Christian Socialists regar-
ding marriage law. The latter –in line with the religious principles 
of a profoundly Catholic country like Austria– resolved that marria-
ge (Catholic) was an indissoluble bond, but, at the same time, the 
administration could grant so-called “dispensations” with which 
the spouses of Catholic faith, who were effectively living separa-
tely, could marry again (Losano, 2008: 113-115) The (political) 
problem emerged from the fact that the dispensations granted by 
the administrative organs often came to be declared “invalid” by the 
Austrian courts, for which, as Kelsen noted in an autobiographical 
work, “it was difficult to rouse the State authority in a more disrup-
tive manner” (Losano, 2008: 116). 
With the passage of time, the issue, by turns and contours ha-
ving become ever more paradoxical and farcical, arrived at the 
Constitutional Court which from the mid-1920s had begun to set 
itself in opposition to the ordinary courts “for their incompetence in 
declaring the administrative acts illegitimate” (Losano, 2008: 119). 
The action of the Court, according to Kelsen, was substantially ai-
med at maintaining a clear “delimitation of competences” between 
courts and administrative organs. 
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Attentive observer of his time and of the speed with which the 
Austrian political scenario was changing, Kelsen published, in 1929, 
two short papers on designs for constitutional reform. As a jurist, he 
enumerated, point by point, The Fundamental Lines of Constitutional 
Reform that, in a word, consisted of three fundamental requirements: 
1) the creation of a third chamber, for professional, i.e., corporate repre-
sentation; 2) the convocation of the National Council, i.e., the central 
Parliament, for “two ordinary sessions”, for which the Parliament would 
no longer be understood as “permanent organ”; 3) the Federal President, 
to whom was consigned the power to “dissolve the National Council”, 
would have the power to enact “regulations (ordinances) and regulations 
of necessity” (Kelsen, 1929: 60-61). 
According to Kelsen, at the heart of these lines of reform, here 
briefly summarized, was an underlying rather precise political de-
sign, i.e., the “struggle against parliamentarianism”. To better ex-
plain the meaning of “struggle” and therefore to better understand 
the “occasion and feasibility of such designs”, in his article on The 
Push for Reform, Kelsen posed a comparison between Austria’s first 
democratic Constitution and the plans presented by the conservati-
ves, shifting his reflections from a legal-theoretical plane to a more 
strictly political one—although, all transpired under the “guise” of 
a discourse which he wanted be (or, rather, which he claimed to be) 
non-evaluative, equable, and strictly scientific. 
Kelsen referred to the definition of the constitution as “expres-
sion of the political forces of a particular people”, calling to mind 
that the Austrian Constitution was the product of a great political 
compromise between the two majority parties, the Christian Social 
Party and the Social Democratic Party: the former had prevented 
the new Constitution, in a manner analogous to that of the far more 
advanced and progressive Weimar, from affirming a clear separation 
between the religious and political spheres; the latter had prevented 
the new State from reorganizing itself into a large confederation of 
Laender (Kelsen, 1929: 49-51). Another key feature of the first de-
mocratic Constitution was parliamentarianism, that is, the creation 
of a republic based on “parliamentary government”. In this, Kelsen 
observed a dangerous internal contradiction emerge which he con-
sidered one of the principle reasons for the profound crisis that be-
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fell Austria: the most powerful party in the central Parliament (Na-
tionalrat), the SPÖ, remained in continuous opposition from 1920, 
while the CSÖ had progressively consolidated its control over the 
Executive (Kelsen, 1929: 51-53).12 
A situation thus emerged, somewhat paradoxical and potentia-
lly dangerous, in which the Socialists “exercised a decisive influence 
on the formation of the will of the State in the legislative office”, 
while the conservatives controlled the reigns of the judiciary and 
administrative systems (Kelsen, 1929: 53).
The result of the political development of the Federal Constitution of 
1920 is a strong imbalance of power between the power of the opposi-
tion [the Social Democrats] within the Legislative branch and its lack 
of power within the Executive branch. From a sociological point of 
view, the sense of present constitutional crisis resides in the attempt of 
bourgeois groups to convey their position of power within the Legisla-
tive branch at the level achieved within the Executive, and to restrict 
or even eliminate the parliamentary system (Kelsen, 1929: 54). 
Kelsen was cognizant of a “shift of power” which was, in fact, 
changing the face of Austria: 
If the call to amend the Constitution grows to such a point that it 
cannot further be deferred, it is certainly a sign that there was a shift 
of power which endeavors to express itself at the constitutional level. 
Such a shift of power is clearly the more deep-rooted reason for the 
Austrian political crisis (Kelsen, 1929: 49). 
In the two brief papers of 1929, legal-technical considerations 
intertwined with those more strictly political. Kelsen endeavored to 
present the characteristics which he retained were the more signifi-
cant reasons for the Austrian crisis, and to present them in the most 
detached manner possible, in essence constructing a discourse that, 
in its intentions, was to be descriptive. With the approval of the 
12 It is interesting to observe how in the short paper of ’29, thinking back to the constituent period, Kelsen 
sustained that in reality the Christian Socialists had willingly accepted the parliamentary government. 
From an analysis of the Stenographische protokolle der provisorischen Nationalversammlung and of the Kons-
tituirenden Nationalversammlung (1918-1920) one derives a very different impression. In this regard I 
would refer to chapter III La nascita della Repubblica democratica austro-tedesca: ottobre 1918-marzo 1919 
In: (Lagi, 2008)   
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constitutional reform of 1929 the democratic and legal-centered 
Republic, born from the ashes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, be-
came a semi-fascist regime of which Dolfuss and Schischnigg were 
its most famous exponents (Pergola, 1981: XI).
One of the most disruptive effects of the constitutional reform 
was the dissolution of the old Constitutional Court and the creation 
of a new one, acquiescent to the interests of the Christian Socia-
lists, whose members were no longer elected for life by Parliament, 
but nominated by the government. It was a change made possible 
only by the support of the Socialists themselves who had given their 
consent in exchange for the presence of two Social Democratic jud-
ges out of fourteen, a choice that Kelsen himself would not hesitate 
to describe in one of his autobiographical papers of 1947 as stupid 
and dangerous:
I said openly to Seitz [referring to Karl Seitz, socialist mayor of Vienna] 
that I thought that the abolition of an independent Constitutional 
Court by the government was a particularly unfortunate step, because 
at that time the fascist inclinations of the Christian Socialists were 
already particularly evident[…] however the Social Democratic Party 
retained that it had to accept the constitutional reform proposed by 
the government in order to save the autonomy of Vienna, which the 
government was threatening to restrict if the party did not accept the 
reform (Losano, 2008: 121). 
 It was in that same fateful year of 1929 that Kelsen published 
the extended second edition of Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie 
(On the Essence and Value of Democracy) in which he analyzed what 
he retained to be the specific characteristics of modern democracy, 
of a system that seemed to be inexorably falling apart in Austria 
and, in great part, Europe, and in which he endeavored, ultimately, 
to identify that highest value, or better, those highest values, that, by 
his judgment, rendered modern democracy the best possible politi-
cal form. With his characteristic equable and clear language, Kel-
sen passed from a descriptive plane to a prescriptive one, so to speak, 
siding openly with liberal, pluralistic, and parliamentary democracy, 
defending it within that “core” of tolerance, dialogue, selection from 
below of the popular ruling class, and liberty, which, in his judgment, 
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was, at its very root, what distinguished it from its antithesis, auto-
cracy (Kelsen, 1929). 
In this regard, The Essence and Value of Democracy clearly ex-
pressed the political ideality behind Kelsen’s defense of the Cons-
titutional Court, which the jurist would revisit several years later 
in a debate with Carl Schmitt, a democratic and liberal ideality that 
constitutional justice, in Kelsen’s judgment, could effectively gua-
rantee and safeguard
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